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Better Cities are Possible
Transport planners used to dream big 
dreams. Gleaming ribbons of steel and 
concrete were going to take us, uninter-
rupted, anywhere we wanted to go. The 
automobile would allow people to have ac-
cess to all the good things their cities had 
to offer, while also enjoying all the ben-
efits of a freestanding house on a spacious 
suburban block. Sufficient roadway space 
would be provided so that everyone could 
share in this bright mobility-based future.1 
Although this dream has had its share of 
critics in recent times, it was not without 
merit.2  The dream of mobility, what might 
be called the great freeway project, ran into 
problems not because of any lack of good 
ideas or intentions, but because inherently 
it could not be made to work. In pursuit of 
this dream many cities drew up detailed 
transportation plans replete with highly 
ambitious road building projects. Indeed 
this was the era of the grand transpor-
tation plan, with transportation planning 
methods initially developed in Detroit and 
Chicago being rapidly exported not only 
to the rest of the USA, but also to much 
of the world.3  Following such grand trans-
portation plans many cities built extensive 
road systems, at great expense in terms 
of both money and damage to urban form 
(bisected neighbourhoods and widespread 
demolition of inner city housing and busi-
nesses), only to see traffic congestion turn 
the dream of mobility into something more 
like one long traffic jam.4
Not only has this outcome considerably 
dampened public enthusiasm for grand 
road building projects, it has also had its 
effect academically. In the 1980s a pleth-
ora of downbeat journal articles started to 
appear as numerous countries, but most 
notably the USA, descended into suburban 
gridlock; an ‘honour’ previously reserved 
for CBD-bound arterial roads. With the ex-
treme decentralisation of work into ‘salt 
and pepper’ patterns across the landscape, 
served primarily by cars along non-radial 
routes, with hardly so much as a peak 
period bus service in operation, the Her-
culean task of trying to match the capacity 
of road infrastructure with demand simply 
became too much.5  During earlier times, 
much academic focus had been on how we 
were going to achieve a car-based mobil-
ity future. By contrast, since the 1980s 
we have, to quote the well known trans-
port academic Professor Phillip Goodwin, 
been trying to solve congestion “when we 
must not build roads, increase spending, 
lose votes, damage the economy, or harm 
the environment, and we will never find 
equilibrium.”6 Although the mobility dream 
may have been at best an overly enthusi-
astic venture and at worst a fool’s errand, 
it was at least a project embarked upon 
with a positive outlook, not the grim task 
outlined by Professor Goodwin. Not that 
he is the most downbeat example. Bleak 
would be the only word to describe the as-
tonishingly titled Transportation Quarterly 
article “Metropolitan Congestion: Towards 
A Tolerable Accommodation”.7 Feel the joie 
de vivre.
This paper rejects the proposition that the 
best we can do with our road networks is 
muddle through, or learn to tolerate con-
gestion. Congestion is a solvable problem. 
Better cities are possible. Most urban net-
works, such as the telephone or electricity 
networks, function smoothly and efficiently 
in many cities around the world; making a 
telephone call is no more difficult than di-
alling a number and electricity is available 
at the flick of a switch. Roads are unusual 
in that they are the only urban network 
that can regularly be observed functioning 
very poorly, even in wealthy cities where 
all other urban networks are running well. 
In cities where the water, sewage, power, 
gas, internet and telephone networks are 
all running relatively smoothly, it is not un-
common to see road networks completely 
overwhelmed by congestion.
All urban networks other than roads use 
one of two techniques to manage ‘traffic’ 
on their systems; they overwhelm demand 
with capacity or they manage demand to 
keep it below capacity. The classic exam-
ple of overwhelming demand with capac-
ity is an electricity network designed with 
sufficient capacity to continue functioning 
on the hottest day of the year. Demand 
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management is also used on many urban 
networks, if only inasmuch as networks 
have a price on their use, thus dampening 
demand. The great freeway project was an 
attempt to overwhelm demand with capac-
ity, an attempt which, given widespread 
congestion, it would have to be said has 
failed. The alternative to overwhelming 
demand with capacity is demand control, 
but this approach is only presently used 
on a small number of roads, such as toll 
roads. With one traffic control approach, 
overwhelming demand with capacity, hav-
ing failed, and the other, demand control, 
not in general use, widespread congestion 
has resulted.
So if the attempt to overwhelm demand 
with capacity has failed, why not wide-
spread demand control? Why do we run 
one, and only one, of our urban networks 
without some protection against conges-
tion? If congestion-proofing all other net-
works makes sense, why does it not make 
sense for roads?
The answer given here will be two fold. In 
the section “How Cars Monopolise Roads 
and Prevent Buses from Competing” it will 
be argued that the damage being done by 
not congestion-proofing roads is greatly 
underestimated, in that the result is not 
just a poorly performing road system, but 
a structurally inefficient urban transport 
solution. Secondly, in the following sec-
tion “Simple and Fair Congestion Control”, 
it will be argued that road pricing, the only 
congestion-proofing method under gener-
al discussion, has serious weaknesses. To 
summarise, this paper will argue that we 
do not congestion-proof roads because the 
damage being done is greatly underesti-
mated and because the only congestion-
proofing method under general discussion 
has serious weaknesses.
To address the first part of this problem, 
that we underestimate the damage being 
done by not congestion-proofing roads, it 
is enough to simply show the greater dam-
age; something which will be done in the 
next section, “How Cars Monopolise Roads 
and Prevent Buses from Competing”. To 
address the second part of this problem, 
that the only congestion-proofing meth-
od under general discussion has serious 
weaknesses, it is not enough to just show 
these weaknesses, an alternative must 
be offered. The following section, “Sim-
ple and Fair Congestion Control”, will use 
an examination of both the strengths and 
weaknesses of road pricing as a basis from 
which to develop an alternative conges-
tion control method, namely congestion 
offsets.
With a key objective for congestion offsets 
being to retain the strengths of road pric-
ing, some readers may, in due course, end 
up seeing sufficient similarities between 
road pricing and congestion offsets that 
they view congestion offsets as just a vari-
ant of road pricing, particularly in cases 
where road pricing has been packaged 
along with the subsidising of public trans-
port, such as in London. Although this pa-
per acknowledges that road pricing has 
significantly informed the development of 
congestion offsets, it rejects the propo-
sition that congestion offsets are just a 
variant of road pricing, and, in the section 
“Simple and Fair Congestion Control”, will 
argue that congestion offsets are a distinct 
method of congestion control.
As will be discussed, a key difference be-
tween congestion offsets and road pric-
ing is the mechanism each approach uses 
to achieve congestion control. With road 
pricing congestion control is achieved by 
constructing a market for road space, and 
then only selling the quantity of road space 
that is actually available. By contrast, with 
congestion offsets congestion control is 
achieved by altering the regulations under 
which roadways are managed; sufficiently 
punishing roadway overuse and sufficient-
ly rewarding roadway underuse so as to 
reduce the quantity of road space used to 
the quantity of road space that is actually 
available. Congestion offsets retain road-
ways as a commons, with the objective 
being simply to better regulate that com-
mons. Regulating a commons is something 
that everyone accepts, even in transport, 
as for example when one receives a fine 
for parking on a street beyond the desig-
nated time allowance, or for parking on a 
street in a location where parking is not 
permitted. By changing the regulations 
under which roadways are managed, so as 
to eliminate congestion, it will be argued 
that our cities could be not just improved, 
but transformed. In short, this paper will 
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argue that we should not accept a ‘toler-
able accommodation’ with congestion.
How Cars Monopolise Roads and Pre-
vent Buses from Competing
All else being equal, it is not possible for 
a bus service to provide a faster journey 
time than a car. Along bus routes, bus 
services incur two unavoidable time over-
heads which cars do not; namely slowing 
down and speeding up from bus stops and 
waiting for passengers to board and alight. 
The impact of these factors can be dem-
onstrated using a somewhat simplified 
model that compares a bus service to a 
car service, in the same setting. To give 
buses their best chance in such a compari-
son, to see buses at their best, cars will 
be compared to a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
service, rather than to a traditional bus 
Figure 1.8  This model is sufficient to show 
the lower speed performance of buses, as 
compared to cars.
To be able to determine the comparative 
speed of the car and BRT services in Fig-
ure 1, it is necessary to know the speed 
of the roadway and BRT line, the distance 
between the two points, the bus boarding 
and alighting times and the bus accelera-
tion and deceleration times. A major up-
date of the Millennium Cities Database for 
Sustainable Transport shows that in for-
ty-three cities covering the US, Canada, 
Australia, Europe and selected Asian cit-
ies, the average roadway speed in 2006 
was 40.9 km/h.9  For the model presented 
here, this figure will be rounded down, and 
40 km/h will be used as the roadway speed 
for cars and for the speed of the BRT line. 
The distance between points A and B will 
service. BRT systems maximise the speed 
performance of buses by using exclusive 
rights-of-way and by measures such as 
level boarding and pre-boarding ticket-
ing. For cars, the model presented will, for 
now, assume roadways free of congestion, 
thereby also showing cars at their best. In 
the real world, cars and buses are often 
not seen at their best; buses normally op-
erate without the benefit of an exclusive 
right-of-way, and cars are, in many cases, 
far from free of the effects of congestion. 
The impact of these real world factors on 
the service speed of cars and buses will be 
addressed later in this section. For now, 
a model of a simplified notional transport 
system between just two stops is shown in 
be 800 metres, which is approximately the 
average inter-stop distance for BRT sys-
tems surveyed in the Bus Rapid Transit 
Planning Guide.10  This 800 metre value is 
also very close to the often-stated value of 
half a mile between stations or stops for 
the transit-oriented development planning 
approach.11 
For boarding and alighting times, each will 
be 12 seconds, approximately half the av-
erage dwell time of the BRT systems sur-
veyed in the Bus Rapid Transit Planning 
Guide.12  Bus acceleration and deceleration 
will both be 1 m/s2; typical average per-
formance numbers.13
Figure 1: Comparison of Car and BRT Services Between Two Points
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The roadway speed number is sufficient 
to calculate the speed of the car service, 
which is 40 km/h, the same as the road-
way speed. Calculating the speed of the 
BRT service is somewhat more complex. 
With the distance of 800 metres between 
stops being known, the average speed 
of the BRT service can be determined by 
calculating how long a bus would take to 
travel between the stops. The total time 
is the sum of the boarding, alighting, ac-
celeration and deceleration times, plus the 
time spent at the roadway speed. At the 
previously given acceleration and decel-
eration figure, a bus would reach the BRT 
line speed of 40 km/h in approximately 11 
seconds over approximately 62 metres, 
and decelerate from the line speed over 
the same time and distance. With accel-
eration and deceleration both taking 62 
metres, this leaves 676 metres of the 800 
metre distance between stops occurring at 
the BRT line speed of 40 km/h, a distance 
that would be covered in approximately 
61 seconds. Add to this time the combined 
acceleration and deceleration time of 22 
seconds and the combined board and 
alight time of 24 seconds, then the total 
time taken to travel between the stops is 
107 seconds. A distance of 800 metres 
covered in 107 seconds gives a speed of 
approximately 27 km/h, so about 67% as 
fast as a car.
The update of the Millennium Cities Da-
tabase for Sustainable Transport shows, 
using the forty cities for which data are 
available, that the average ratio between 
bus speed and car speed is 54%.14  The 
worst performing city is Chicago at 30% 
and the best performing city is Hamburg 
at 89%. To compare this real world data 
to the theoretical outcome produced by 
the model, roadway speed must be taken 
into account, as the model is based on a 
speed of 40 km/h whereas the forty real 
world cities have average roadway speeds 
ranging from 24.0 km/h for Berlin to 57.5 
km/h for Chicago. Slower roadway speeds 
make it easier for buses to compete with 
cars, as the buses have to spend less time 
getting up to and down from the roadway 
speed, and also because board and alight 
times become a smaller proportion of the 
total trip time. Figure 2 shows, across the 
speed range 0 km/h to 60 km/h, the ratio 
between bus and car speeds produced by 
the model.
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, when all other 
factors are kept constant, slower roadway 
speeds result in better performance ratios 
for buses. If the cities from the Millennium 
Cities Database are compared to the mod-
el, at the average roadway speed for each 
city, an idea can be gained of how well the 
bus systems in these cities are perform-
ing. Figure 3 shows the forty cities from 
the Millennium Cities Database and the 
percentage by which they underperform 
Figure 2: Ratio of Bus Speed to Car Speed Across a Range of Roadway Speeds
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or outperform the model. Negative values 
show cities that are underperforming the 
model and positive values ones that are 
outperforming it.
With the average road speed for each city 
used as the speed for the model, only four 
cities outperform the modelled BRT sys-
tem, namely Berlin, Frankfurt, Brussels 
and Hamburg. Three of those four cities, 
Berlin, Frankfurt, and Brussels, only out-
perform the model slightly, with ratios that 
are three, five and eight percent higher 
than the model respectively. The only city 
to significantly outperform the model is 
Hamburg, which has a ratio 15% higher 
than the model. An assumption of the 
model is that cars and buses operate at 
the same speed, which is not the case in 
Hamburg. Due to the total removal of its 
light rail system, Hamburg now has most 
major bus routes operating in the middle 
of wide roads on dedicated bus lanes, and 
it also has pre-emptive green-wave traf-
fic light technology in operation. Although 
some caution is warranted when compar-
ing real world and theoretical data, the 
fact that only 10% of the real world cities 
outperform the theoretical model suggests 
that the presented BRT system is a higher 
than average performance bus system. 
This is as intended; the model presented 
here aims to show buses at their best, not 
to show an average bus system.
 
In terms of general trends, in Figure 3 it 
can be seen that the cities with the best 
performing bus systems are predominate-
ly in Europe, with eight of the ten best per-
forming cities being European. It was in 
such European cities that the grand trans-
portation plan era was at its most limited, 
and where serious efforts have been made 
to have transit as a competitive travel op-
tion. The cities with the worst performing 
bus systems are predominately in the USA, 
with seven of the ten worst performing cit-
ies being US cities. The USA is where the 
great freeway project achieved its zenith 
and where efforts to accommodate and 
provide for competitive transit systems, 
for example through the provision of bus 
lanes, reached their nadir.
For both the modelled case and the em-
pirical data, the data represents only the 
transit line speed; the ‘in-vehicle time’ 
from the perspective of a passenger. Nei-
ther the average ratio of 54% bus speed 
versus car speed for the real world data, 
or the 67% ratio for the model include 
time spent waiting for a bus to arrive, or 
the speed difference between walking to a 
main road to catch a bus, as compared to 
driving there. Given the figures used in the 
model, the best a BRT system can deliver 
is a speed 67% as fast as a car. To achieve 
this outcome, a passenger would have to 
be travelling from a location right on top 
of a BRT stop to a location right on top of 
another BRT stop and arrive at their de-
parture stop exactly as their bus is about 
to depart. This is far from the typical case. 
Normally, passengers have to walk some 
distance to catch their bus service, wait for 
that service, and then, after alighting their 
Figure 3: Real World Performance Compared to the Model
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bus, walk to reach their final destination. 
Normal bus use is door-to-door, not stop-
to-stop (or, in the case of traditional bus 
services, door-to-door, not kerb-to-kerb).
To calculate the speed impact of these two 
additional factors, getting to and from BRT 
stops and waiting for services to arrive, the 
model presented must be expanded to be 
a model of a full urban transport system. 
Based on the 800 metre distance between 
stops, the model will be expanded to con-
sist of an 800 metre grid of major roads 
along which BRT lines also run, with a BRT 
interchange stop at every intersection; a 
model that is similar to the Squaresville 
model of Dr. Paul Mees.15  From the US 
2009 National Household Travel Survey, 
the average trip length for this model ur-
ban transport system will be, as near as 
possible, 15.7 kilometres.16  On an 800 
metre grid, the average distance travelled 
to get to a stop, assuming uniform popula-
tion density, would be 400 metres at both 
the departure and arrival end, so 800 me-
tres in total. To, again, give buses their 
best chance in this comparison, a tran-
sit-oriented development style of urban 
planning will be assumed, with sufficient 
focusing of development around each 
transit stop to reduce total walking dis-
tance to 200 metres at both the departure 
and arrival end, so 400 metres in total, or 
half the distance at uniform density. This 
leaves 15.3 kilometres of the 15.7 kilome-
tre distance to be travelled on the BRT sys-
tem, which, at 800 metres between stops, 
is 19.125 stops. For this model, 19 stops 
will be used, yielding a total trip distance 
of 15.6 kilometres. As for passenger wait 
time; this is determined by bus service 
frequency. The service frequency for BRT 
systems surveyed in the Bus Rapid Tran-
sit Planning Guide, averaging the available 
peak and non-peak figures, is one bus on 
average every six minutes, which gives an 
average wait time of three minutes.17
The car speed on non-arterial roads will, 
for this model, be assumed to be 20 km/h, 
an aggressively traffic calmed level. At this 
speed, the 400 metre trip to and from an 
arterial road, 200 metres at both the start 
and end of the journey, would take a to-
tal time of 72 seconds. The remaining dis-
tance of 15,200 metres on arterial roads 
running at 40 km/h would take 1,368 
seconds, yielding a door-to-door travel 
time of 1,440 seconds and, over the 15.6 
kilometre total distance, an average trip 
speed of 39 km/h. As before, calculating 
the speed of the BRT service is somewhat 
more complicated. Also in a similar fashion 
as before, with the door-to-door trip dis-
tance of 15.6 kilometres being known, the 
average speed of the BRT service can be 
calculated by calculating the total time a 
person would take to make this trip using 
the service. The total time is the sum of 
the time passengers spend walking to and 
from their departure and destination BRT 
stops, the time spent waiting for bus serv-
ices to arrive, plus the time spent traveling 
on the BRT system itself. With regards to 
wait times, a reasonable assumption for a 
grid of BRT lines is that a person would 
have to wait twice for a bus, once on a 
horizontal line and once on a vertical line. 
At the previously mentioned figure of an 
average wait of three minutes for a bus, 
the total wait time would be six minutes. 
As for the 200 metre walking trip at each 
end of the journey, at a brisk pace of five 
km/h this distance of 400 metres would be 
covered in 288 seconds. Finally, the time 
spent on the BRT system itself needs to be 
calculated. From previous calculations, the 
time between stops is 107 seconds, which 
yields, for the 19 stops being travelled, a 
BRT travel time of 2,033 seconds. Add all 
these values together, and the total 15.6 
kilometre journey takes 2,681 seconds, at 
an average door-to-door speed of approxi-
mately 20.9 km/h.
So, in a congestion free environment, a BRT 
system, on a grid of BRT lines spaced at a 
typical transit-oriented development level 
of 800 metres with development focused 
around stops, is able to provide a door-
to-door travel speed approximately 54% 
as fast as a car. Slight further improve-
ments might be possible to this theoretical 
outcome via the running of express buses, 
though their speed impact tends to be cur-
tailed by the concomitant increase in wait 
times at stops, as passengers watch other 
people’s express buses whoosh by. Anal-
ysis showing, in an uncongested setting, 
BRT delivering door-to-door travel speeds 
only a little better than half as fast as a 
car, is not the slightest bit controversial. 
There is no analysis anywhere showing 
BRT systems being even close to competi-
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tive with cars in terms of speed, in an un-
congested setting, because there cannot 
be such analysis. With regards to door-
to-door trip times, there are four areas in 
which buses incur time costs that cars do 
not; namely time accelerating from and 
decelerating to stops, time boarding and 
alighting, time waiting for buses to arrive, 
and the extra time needed to walk to and 
from bus stops.
There are no areas in which cars incur 
time costs that buses do not. As a con-
sequence, regardless of how the figures 
are ‘tweaked’ in a model such as the one 
given, no model whose method and data 
has any grounding in the real world is go-
ing to show anything except even very 
good BRT systems only providing a door-
to-door speed around half that provided 
by a car, in an uncongested setting. In-
deed, the overall speed outcome from the 
model, which has BRT providing a service 
speed 54% as fast as a car, is based on a 
transit line speed that is 67% as fast as a 
car. Only seven out of the previously dis-
cussed forty cities from the Millennium Cit-
ies Database update had a bus perform-
ance outcome greater than 67%.18  All of 
these cities are European, and all have an 
average roadway speed lower than the 40 
km/h speed used for the model, with the 
average roadway speed for this group of 
seven cities being 29.4 km/h. As previous-
ly discussed, lower roadway speeds result 
in better bus performance ratios.
It is the above type of analysis that under-
pinned the great freeway project; the post-
war attempt to provide automobile mobil-
ity to all via vast road building projects. 
After all, if it can be demonstrated in a few 
pages that buses cannot possibly compete 
with the speed of cars, why not deliver the 
‘best’ option to all. It is, though, an as-
sumption of the above analysis that there 
are no capacity constraints and therefore 
there is no congestion. If analysis such as 
that above is conducted with capacity con-
straints, a very different picture emerges.
Consider, for example, a typical urban 
road. The capacity of the road lanes that 
make up such roads depends on many fac-
tors. Here, a capacity figure of 700 pas-
senger cars per hour per lane will be used; 
the mid-point of the capacity range given 
in Urban Transit Systems and Technology 
for private autos on a street (as opposed 
to on a freeway) which is “heavily loaded 
but somewhat below capacity.”19  At an av-
erage occupancy of 1.67 people per car, 
the average level recorded by the US 2009 
National Household Travel Survey,20  one 
lane with a capacity of 700 passenger cars 
per hour (pcph) can service a load up to 
1,169 people per hour using cars. For the 
sake of simplicity, the measure “people 
per hour” will be referred to, from here on, 
as passengers per hour (pph), the metric 
used for public transport. When reporting 
values for cars, all passengers per hour 
levels will, of course, include the driver of 
a car. The occupancy level being used here 
is somewhat generous since it is an overall 
average occupancy for cars, which includes 
more heavily loaded cars on weekends 
and other off-peak times when people go 
out together for social purposes and roads 
are often less busy. Roads are most heav-
ily loaded during peak or near peak times, 
when average occupancies tend to be only 
a little over one person per car, due pri-
marily to the widely acknowledged issue 
of single occupancy driving when traveling 
to and from work.
By contrast to the 1,169 pph capacity us-
ing cars, a BRT service could support far 
higher loads in a single lane. For exam-
ple, a simple BRT service might consist of 
one all-stop and one express bus service, 
both running at three minute intervals. 
If such a service were run using typical 
twelve metre buses, then the crush-load 
capacity of each bus would be of the order 
of 85 passengers.21  Unlike car services, 
the normal mode of operation for buses 
is for strangers to travel together and so 
all of the capacity of these buses could 
be utilised. The maximum capacity level 
of the example BRT service would only be 
touched for one moment and at one point 
along its route, with other times and areas 
running at lower levels due to passenger 
load variation, but this is also what occurs 
with at-capacity car services. Two services 
each running at three minute intervals, 
gives a total service level of 40 buses an 
hour. With each bus having a maximum 
capacity of 85 passengers, the overall BRT 
service would have a maximum capacity 
of 3,400 pph.
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The 40 buses an hour needed to run this 
3,400 pph bus service would only use a 
very small proportion of the capacity of 
a BRT lane. By comparison, any attempt 
to service this 3,400 pph load using cars 
on the example 700 pcph roadway lane, 
which is heavily loaded when servicing 
1,169 pph, would very quickly reduce the 
lane from full speed to a zero or near-zero 
speed. Using the previous door-to-door 
journey speed calculation method, Figure 
4 shows the speed of a car service oper-
ating from full roadway speed, the previ-
ously used 40 km/h figure, to the roadway 
being jammed, at 0 km/h. The roadway 
speed scale in Figure 4 is shown, left to 
right, from highest speed to lowest speed, 
reversing the typical presentation, so as 
to show the impact on service speed as 
congestion increases. For comparison pur-
poses, the speed of the example BRT serv-
ice is also shown, unaffected by the car-
related congestion degrading the speed of 
the roadway that the cars are running on.
Presented separately, the superior speed 
performance of cars at higher car roadway 
speeds, which would occur at lower load 
levels, is clear. Also clear, though, is the 
superior speed performance of buses at 
higher loads, once congestion has taken its 
toll and the speed of the car roadway has 
dropped. In this example, once the road-
way speed has dropped to below approxi-
mately 21 km/h, the example BRT service 
is providing a faster door-to-door journey 
time than a car. But cars and buses do not 
typically run independently as is shown in 
Figure 4; in the general case, buses share 
a roadway with cars. By running buses 
in an exclusive lane, BRT in many ways 
has more in common with heavy rail, as 
those who conceived this mode intended, 
than it does with buses on normal shared-
use roads. Indeed, a strong case could be 
made that the running of buses in an ex-
clusive lane, rather than in traffic, is the 
defining feature of BRT, and the reason 
we have a separate name for this transit 
mode. Figure 5 shows what happens when 
the car and bus services are run on the 
same roadway; in other words what hap-
pens when the BRT buses are taken off 
their exclusive right-of-way and mixed in 
with car traffic.
 
With cars and buses sharing the roadway, 
there are no points at which buses outper-
form cars. As can be seen in Figure 5, al-
though it is the car users who are causing 
the congestion, the bus users are bearing 
the cost of congestion along with the car 
users. Operating in a congested environ-
ment imposes two costs on bus services, 
the time cost to passengers of longer 
journeys and the extra cost to operators 
of running a slower service, with more 
buses and drivers being needed to serv-
ice routes at lower speeds and, of course, 
higher generalised operating costs such as 
fuel and wear and tear. By bearing a part 
of the burden of the congestion caused 
by cars, buses provide a worse service 
and cost more to run. Instead of cars be-
Figure 4: Car and BRT Service Speed on Separate Roadways
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ing faster at lower loads and buses being 
faster at higher loads, cars become faster 
at all loads by offloading part of their con-
gestion cost onto buses. In effect, the car 
mode has been allowed to ‘poison’ the bus 
mode.
The role of the bus mode, the mode crip-
pled by cars, is not one that the car mode 
can effectively substitute for. At a level of 
1,169 pph, where cars are heavily load-
ing a single lane, there is just enough load 
to run a high frequency bus service. For 
example, a load level of 1,169 pph would 
fill approximately 14 standard twelve me-
tre buses to capacity every hour, yielding 
a service frequency of one bus approxi-
mately every four minutes.22  To show 
the amount of road space that would be 
used by a 14 buses per hour service, it is 
necessary to know how much road space 
a bus takes up compared to a car. From 
the Transport Research Board’s Highway 
Capacity Manual, buses will be calculated 
here as taking up twice the road space of 
cars, the mid-point between the figures 
for level and rolling terrain.23  Using this 
conversion rate, a 14 buses per hour serv-
ice would require 28 of the 700 pcph ‘slots’ 
The capacity range that buses on normal 
roads can comfortably service, and the 
percentage of roadway used, is a critical 
issue. If you reduce the above described 
bus service from 14 buses an hour to sev-
en buses an hour, one bus approximately 
every nine minutes, you reduce the load 
serviced to 595 pph, and the percent-
age of roadway used to 2%. At this nine 
minute frequency, you are close to the 
border of where people stop just turning 
up and waiting for a bus, and start looking 
at timetables;24  a characteristic that will 
be used here to mark the low end of the 
load range which buses on normal roads 
can be said to comfortably service. At the 
high end of the load range, if you increase 
the frequency of the all-stop service to one 
bus every three minutes and run three 
parallel express services at the same serv-
ice frequency, you now have a 6,800 pph 
bus service using approximately 23% of 
the available roadway slots. Use 18 me-
tre, 110 passenger buses,25  which will use 
slightly more roadway space, then capac-
ity increases to 8,800 pph. This 8,800 pph 
level is in the same general capacity range 
as a three lane freeway running just cars, 
reflective of the massively better roadway 
available on the example road lane. In 
other words, the described 14 buses per 
hour service would use up 4% of the avail-
able road space, one-twenty-fifth of the 
road space required by cars to service the 
same load. Another way of looking at this 
is to say that to provide the same service 
using cars would require twenty-five times 
more roadway space than using buses.
utilisation of buses in comparison to cars. 
Although, in principle, the load that buses 
on normal roads are able to service could 
be pushed higher than this level, it is at 
these higher load levels that BRT and rail 
solutions begin to come into their own.
In terms of infrastructure, buses on nor-
mal roads are able to comfortably service 
mid-level loads using only a small slice of 
Figure 5: Car and Bus Service Speed on a Shared Roadway
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the roadway capacity of one lane. In the 
above examples, 595 to 8,800 pph loads 
were serviced using approximately 2 to 
23% of the capacity of a heavily loaded 
roadway lane. If the approximate mid-
points of these values are taken, then 
buses on normal roads can be character-
ised as a transport mode that can serv-
ice loads of the order of 5,000 pph, and 
which require approximately one-eighth 
of the capacity of a heavily loaded road 
lane to do so. Attempt to service these 
mid-level loads with cars, and the road-
way resources required are of the order of 
twenty-five times higher, due to the car’s 
inefficient use of roadway space; hence 
the chronic congestion problems of the car 
mode. Attempt to service these loads us-
ing BRT and, with the defining character-
istic of BRT being the use of an exclusive 
right-of-way, you incur 100% of the road 
lane infrastructure cost, eight times that 
used by buses on normal roads. Attempt 
to service these loads with heavy rail and 
you again incur 100% of the right-of-way 
infrastructure cost, plus you are trying 
to service mid-level loads with a mode 
that excels at high-loads. As with cars, in 
servicing mid-level passenger loads, BRT 
and heavy rail also have massively high-
er right-of-way infrastructure needs than 
buses on normal roads, due, perversely, 
to their passenger carrying efficiency. BRT 
and heavy rail take 100% of a lane and 
then, at mid-level passenger loads, use 
that lane so efficiently that most of it is left 
unused. Cars on normal road lanes, and 
buses and trains in exclusive lanes, both, 
for divergent reasons, use vastly more 
right-of-way infrastructure when servicing 
mid-level passenger loads than buses on 
normal roads. From the previous calcula-
tions, cars use twenty-five times the right-
of-way infrastructure of buses on normal 
roads, and both BRT and heavy rail use 
eight times as much.
 
Heavy rail, the running of trains in an ex-
clusive right-of-way, is not, of course, the 
only way to operate trains; trains can also 
be run on normal roads. Such services are 
known variously as trams or light rail, and 
although some such systems run in sec-
tions at least on exclusive lanes, others 
run on normal roads, mixed in with traf-
fic. Light rail services differ from bus serv-
ices in a number of important respects. 
Perhaps the most important of these dif-
ferences is that light rail vehicles have a 
maximum passenger capacity far higher 
than that of buses. Urban Transit Systems 
and Technology lists light rail vehicles as 
having a maximum passenger capacity 
more than six times that of buses, with 
the maximum capacity of regular buses 
being listed as 120 passengers, whereas 
multi-carriage light rail vehicles are listed 
as having a maximum capacity of 750 pas-
sengers.26  Not only does this greater ca-
pacity mean that light rail can service the 
same passenger load as buses using less 
drivers, it also reduces all costs that in-
crease with fleet size, such as vehicle and 
driver scheduling costs. The ubiquitous use 
of either pre-boarding ticketing or conduc-
tors to issue tickets is a further advantage 
of light rail, though, in this case, one that 
could be adopted more widely by tradition-
al bus services. For all of the differences 
between buses and light rail, there is one 
stark similarity; when light rail is run in 
traffic it has exactly the same car-caused 
congestion problems that buses on normal 
roads have. In a situation where conges-
tion was controlled, the performance of 
light rail systems running in traffic would 
be enhanced, and much of the discussion 
in this paper, which applies to buses, may 
also apply to such light rail systems.
To summarise, currently all of the public 
transport options for servicing mid-level 
loads either have their speed performance 
crippled by the congestion caused by cars, 
or have their financial position seriously 
degraded by having to pick up 100% of 
their right-of-way cost, eight times the av-
erage amount required by buses on nor-
mal roads to service mid-level loads. Due 
to the congestion caused by cars, cities 
lack a really effective mid-level transport 
mode, one that is both reasonably fast and 
reasonably cheap.
Cars are normally occupied by one or two 
people, buses by many tens of people 
and heavy rail trains by many hundreds 
of people. The proper role for cars, buses 
and heavy rail trains as, respectively, low, 
mid, and high load services could not be 
more apparent. It is a simplification to say 
that cars work best between 0 and 1,000 
pph, buses work best between 1,000 and 
10,000 pph and heavy rail trains work best 
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between 10,000 and 100,000 pph; but it 
is not much of a simplification. Although, 
with multiple lanes, cars can provide many 
times the previously calculated 1,169 pph 
capacity of a single lane, such multi-lane 
roads can be seen, in many situations, as 
merely a desperate attempt to keep the 
low capacity car mode functioning, an is-
sue that will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next section.
The 1,000 to 10,000 pph mid-level load 
range is not a minor one; vast swathes 
of the urban transport task occur in this 
range. Cars, though, via the mechanism 
of congestion, have stopped buses on nor-
mal roads, the obvious transport mode for 
servicing these mid-level loads, from com-
peting on its merits. Consequently, a ca-
pability chasm has opened up between low 
and high loads, with no mode being avail-
able to effectively service mid-level loads. 
The result has been disastrous. The story 
of many modern cities, particularly low to 
mid-density cities, is the car mode running 
well over capacity and the heavy rail mode 
running well under capacity, as transport 
planners desperately try to make each 
mode service mid-level passenger loads 
that neither is suited to. A train line op-
erating at a fraction of its potential capac-
ity, running alongside a heavily congested 
arterial road, is the signature image of the 
modern transport planning dilemma. This 
dilemma will not be resolved until cars 
are no longer permitted to offload their 
congestion costs onto buses, or, in other 
words, until buses are allowed to compete.
Simple and Fair Congestion Control
What would lead a person to believe — 
even for a moment — that a sensible ap-
proach to urban transport was possible 
without some form of roadway congestion 
control? For cities without railways, roads 
are the entire motorised transportation so-
lution, and even for those cities that have 
significant rail systems, roads still play a 
critical role. For example, London, home of 
the well-known London Underground, as 
well as a substantial surface rail system, 
still had 67% of its motorised travel hap-
pening in private cars as of 2006.27  Few 
if any cities have such widespread alter-
natives to road transport that they can 
afford to let their road networks operate 
in a dysfunctional manner. Nevertheless, 
such operation is the norm. It is, after all, 
dysfunctional to run a network, any net-
work, where the service provided regularly 
collapses due to load exceeding capacity, 
without instituting some form of conges-
tion control. Furthermore, in both the pop-
ular and academic literature, there seems 
to be a distinct absence of either lay peo-
ple or planning experts rushing to defend 
congestion as the sensible outcome; when 
congestion is talked about it is normally in 
tones of condemnation not praise. So if, as 
a matter of logic, it would seem running 
road networks without congestion control 
makes no sense, and if congestion is wide-
ly disparaged, why do the overwhelming 
majority of cities continue to run their 
road networks without congestion control?
The answer that will be given here is that 
there is only really one idea, road pricing, 
in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ about roadway 
congestion control, and that road pricing 
has two serious weaknesses, which will be 
discussed.28  There are many ideas in the 
related disciplines of urban planning and 
transportation planning — transit-oriented 
development, balanced transport, sustain-
able planning — but, other than road pric-
ing, none of them are directly aimed at 
congestion. None can show, as road pric-
ing can, in a short, clear and compelling 
manner how chronic congestion could be 
eliminated. Ironically, the free market idea 
as to what to do about congestion lacks 
competition.
That the economics profession has some-
thing significant to say about congestion is 
not surprising; the management of scar-
city is commonly said to be the central 
focus of economic thought.29  Roads are 
a scarce resource and so, as a matter of 
inevitable economic logic, if you do not 
implement a rationing scheme then queu-
ing (i.e. congestion) becomes your default 
rationing scheme. Not having a formal 
rationing scheme in place does not, after 
all, change the scarce nature of the road-
way resource. Economists highlight the 
fact that the use of queuing as a ration-
ing scheme leads to a wildly inefficient al-
location of roadway resources. For exam-
ple, an eye surgeon, whose time might be 
billed out at hundreds of dollars an hour 
sits in traffic the same as, for example, a 
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junior office clerk, whose time might only 
be billed out at fifteen dollars an hour. 
The economic solution to this problem is 
road pricing,30  a market based approach, 
which is really what you would expect any 
mainstream economist to say, regardless 
of the road context. Present to an econo-
mist a general problem where the prima-
ry context was resource scarcity, and the 
primary symptom was queuing, and then 
ask for a ‘diagnosis’ and they would likely 
say that the correct course of treatment is 
to establish a market and may also com-
ment that you have a common, but readily 
treatable ailment, called socialism.
The basic mechanism of road pricing is 
that people pay for the road space they 
use. If the objective is simply congestion 
control, then these payments may be lim-
ited to times and places where there is a 
congestion problem, with free access to 
the roads allowed otherwise. This mecha-
nism has one key strength, namely that 
it works. Set a price for being on a road, 
with higher prices during times and places 
of higher demand for road space, and traf-
fic levels will be reduced. Make the price 
sufficiently high and congestion will be 
eliminated. No one needs to be convinced 
of this, it is both intellectually obvious and 
can be seen on a number of tollways which 
have been built above free access road-
ways, where the tollway is running below 
capacity and the free access roadway is 
hopelessly congested. Along with the key 
strength of road pricing — that it works 
— it will be argued here that road pricing 
has two key weaknesses, one political and 
one organisational. The objective of the 
rest of this section will be to outline these 
two weaknesses and thereby develop an 
alternative approach, namely congestion 
offsets, which retains the key strength of 
road pricing — that it works — but which 
does not have its weaknesses. Both the 
weaknesses of road pricing relate to the 
mechanism of its operation; that money is 
paid to buy access to road space.
Paying for something is an implicit ac-
knowledgement that you do not own what 
you are paying for. People do not pay rent 
on a house that they own; as to do so 
would be to accept that they do not own it. 
Local council rates are generally accepted, 
but these payments are used to provide 
local services, not for the right to reside 
at a house, as such. In a similar manner, 
to pay to use road space is to implicitly 
acknowledge that you do not own that 
road space. As with local council rates, 
road taxes are widely accepted as these 
payments are used to maintain the roads, 
not for the right to use the roads as such. 
Currently roads are owned by the people 
and held in trust by the government; they 
are a commons. Road pricing involves 
transferring ownership of the roads from 
the populous to either the government or 
private interests, who then charge people 
for access to what was previously theirs. 
People’s dislike of being dispossessed of 
what is theirs, and therefore of road pric-
ing, would be considered by some to be 
proper, and really should be considered by 
most to be expected. Land is not a second-
tier issue, and a strong case can be made 
that public roads and streets represent the 
last great area of common land. Whether 
ownership of this land is transferred to 
the government or to private interests, 
as required by road pricing, both options 
involve people’s disenfranchisement from 
arguably this last great commons. This 
requirement for a loss of ownership has 
made road pricing all but impossible to sell 
politically, and is a key political weakness 
of road pricing as a congestion control 
method.
An alternative to the loss of ownership re-
quired by road pricing is to keep the roads 
as common property, held in trust by the 
government, but to change the regula-
tions under which that commons is man-
aged. The current roadway regulations, 
most everywhere, distill down to saying: 
“you may take more than your fair share 
of available road space.” Given that not 
taking more than your fair share is such 
a basic moral principle that it tends to be 
one of the first taught to young children, 
it is little short of bizarre that we run our 
roads this way. What might the roadway 
commons look like if it were instead man-
aged under the principle: “you may, on 
average, take only your fair share of avail-
able road space?”
At the moment people claim road space by 
taking a vehicle onto a roadway. If that ve-
hicle is a car, one road slot is claimed; for 
larger vehicles, such as buses and trucks 
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a greater number of slots are claimed, and 
for smaller vehicles, such as motorcycles, 
a lesser number of slots are claimed. Con-
gestion occurs when the number of road 
slots claimed is in excess of the number of 
road slots that are available. The number 
of people inside a vehicle has, in the gen-
eral case, no effect on the amount of road 
space that can be claimed. It is difficult 
to see how an approach based on vehicle 
size could even begin to meet any criteria 
of fairness; it is just by default what hap-
pens. Instead, consider the simplest no-
tion of a fair share; that a fair share is an 
even share. In the classic example, if there 
is a cake to be divided up between peo-
ple then it is ‘fair’ that everyone gets an 
even slice. This is a simple approach, and 
it does have its weaknesses. For example, 
what if one of the people who the cake is 
being shared between is currently starving 
to death; should that person only get an 
even share? Similarly, in a transport con-
text, few people object to disabled drivers 
receiving privileged parking access. Nev-
ertheless, an even slice, an even share, is 
a widely used moral principle, and will be 
used here to examine what taking one’s 
fair share of road space might involve. 
How does road use look if “a fair share” is 
taken to mean that people are entitled to 
an even slice of a roadway they are on?
To examine this question, it is useful to re-
turn to the roadway capacity example of 
the previous section, where one lane had 
a capacity, when heavily loaded, of 700 
pcph. If such a road lane is loaded equally 
with people travelling in cars and those 
travelling in buses, using the same occu-
pancy levels and other values as the previ-
ous section, how much road space is used 
by each group? To load the example single 
lane to capacity equally with car and bus 
users requires approximately 2,250 road-
way users per hour, approximately 1,125 
users for each mode. With the users so 
split, Figure 6 shows the road space utili-
sation levels for these 2,250 roadway us-
ers on a road lane that has a capacity of 
700 pcph.
As shown by the average bar in Figure 
6, when a roadway lane with 700 avail-
able slots is loaded with 2,250 users, the 
fair share of road space is approximately 
0.311 slots per user. Figure 6 also shows 
that car users are using far more of the 
roadway than the average, at a level of 
approximately 0.599 slots per user, and 
that bus users are using far less, at a lev-
el of approximately 0.024 slots per user. 
Even if the bus occupancy level is reduced 
to be the same as that for cars, based on 
the assumption that a car has five seats, 
car users still come in well above the av-
erage, and bus user still well below. At 
an equal 33% occupancy, the car users’ 
slot use remains at approximately 0.599 
slots, and the bus users’ slot use increases 
from approximately 0.024 to 0.071 slots. 
So, even with equal occupancy, car users 
are still taking approximately eight times 
the road space of bus users. The overuse 
of road space by car users can be seen 
more clearly in Figure 7 which, using the 
same occupancy levels as those for Figure 
Figure 6: Use of Slots by Mode
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6, shows the difference from the average, 
with positive values showing slot overuse 
and negative values showing slot under-
use.
In Figure 7, it can be seen that, for this ex-
ample, car users are taking approximately 
0.288 slots more than their fair share and 
bus users are taking approximately 0.288 
slots less than their fair share. At this 
point, with the roadway heavily loaded, 
each bus user is generously ‘donating’ ap-
proximately 0.288 slots to a car user. Even 
in the absence of congestion, as is the case 
here, the above situation is highly unfair. 
The car users’ congestion-free trip is only 
being made possible by the bus passen-
gers’ decision to take a bus, thus freeing 
up road space which allows for the car us-
ers roadway overuse. Tip over the line into 
congestion, and not only are car users tak-
ing more than their fair share of roadway 
space, they begin dumping part of the cost 
Road pricing gives a lead as to how the 
above situation might be addressed, such 
that roadways are managed under the 
principle: “you may, on average, take only 
your fair share of available road space.” 
With road pricing, roadway users are cus-
tomers, not owners, and so everyone us-
ing roadways pays and there is a net flow 
of value from the customers to the ex-
ternal roadway owners, be they private 
interests or the government. If, though, 
roadways are a commons, such transfers 
should be made between the owners, from 
those who are over-using a roadway to 
those who are under-using it, with no net 
flow of value outside the group of own-
ers, namely the public. This could be done, 
during times when road space is scarce, 
by charging private vehicle users, who are 
on average overusing the roads, and by 
paying public bus users, who are on aver-
age under-using the roads.
of the congestion they are causing onto 
bus users. All statements about buses be-
ing “unable to compete” with cars should 
be viewed in this light. Due to the way 
roads are regulated, or not regulated, bus 
users are ‘punished’ with congestion while 
also donating road space to those that 
are dishing out that punishment. Take the 
bus; no good deed will go unpunished. In 
this situation, of course buses “can’t com-
pete.” Saying that buses cannot compete 
is like saying a boxer who has been given 
tranquillisers cannot compete against an-
other who has been given amphetamines; 
technically true but highly misleading.
Paying public bus users directly would risk 
people chasing the payment as income, 
but such payments could be made indi-
rectly, by reducing the price of bus tick-
ets via a discount. There is no real limit 
to how large such discounts could be, as 
ticket prices could be raised to accommo-
date higher discount levels, with the extra 
funds being used to improve bus system 
infrastructure, or to fund other costs as-
sociated with providing a better bus serv-
ice.31  These discounts are not a subsidy, 
they are a payment for the use of a scarce 
resource from the people who are overus-
ing that resource to the people who had a 
Figure 7: Overuse and Under-use of Slots by Mode
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right to that resource but gave it up. The 
community could decide how much traf-
fic would be allowed on a given roadway, 
econometric professionals determine what 
transfer price would need to be charged 
at given times to hit that target, and each 
person overusing the roadway pays each 
person under-using it. The higher the 
transfer price from car users to bus users, 
the less attractive the car option becomes 
and the more attractive the bus option be-
comes. As more people use buses, overall 
vehicle load drops. If the outcome is road-
way under-use, the transfer price was set 
too high. If the outcome is roadway over-
use, the transfer price was set too low.
Such an approach would be financially 
neutral for a person who was not over-us-
ing the roads. Take, for example, someone 
who travelled to work and back Monday to 
Friday, where there was only one-fifth of 
the required road space available to make 
that journey in a car everyday. To achieve 
a given traffic level, the cost of taking a 
car on this trip to work might be set at 
$8 a day, charged in a manner to be dis-
cussed shortly. Bus users would, for this 
example, receive a $2 discount on their 
fare each day for their roadway under-
use. If a person took the bus to work four 
days a week and their car one day a week 
they would pay $8 on the day they took 
their car and, on the other four days, have 
their bus ticket discounted by $2, for a 
total discount of $8. The requirement to 
pay $8 and the total discount of $8 cancel 
each other out. For those currently using 
a fair share of roadway space, the intro-
duction of congestion offsets would have 
a negligible direct effect; the money lost 
and the money gained would balance out. 
For those using more than their fair share 
of roadway space, they would pay those 
using less than their fair share. In both 
cases, the public would remain owners of 
the roads. Such a system would cost mon-
ey to administer, but as with local council 
taxes or road taxes, such payments would 
be used to provide a roadway congestion 
control service, not for the right to use a 
fair share of the roads, as such. Conges-
tion offsets do not require the loss of pub-
lic ownership of the roadway commons, a 
key political weakness of road pricing.
The second key weakness of road pric-
ing is organisational, and again relates to 
the fact that, under road pricing, money 
is paid to buy access to road space. Pay-
ments come in many forms, such as pur-
chases, taxes and fines, and each pay-
ment type has a different character. With 
road pricing the payment type is a fee for 
a service, with each driver acting in the 
role of a customer who is purchasing road 
space. When making a purchase, people 
expect to pay for what they use, not for 
more than they use. Few people would 
be happy if they went to a shop to buy a 
litre of milk and the shopkeeper tried to 
charge them for two litres. Because road 
pricing works via the payment of a fee for 
a service, precise metering is needed. In 
the few cities that have implemented road 
pricing, sophisticated toll gate systems are 
the norm, and, in significant part due to 
this complexity, such road pricing systems 
tend to be limited to the centre of the city.
If the objective is instead to regulate the 
roadway commons, a fee for a service is 
not the only payment method that might 
be used. Another method, already widely 
used in other areas of roadway commons 
regulation, is available; namely the penal-
ising of misbehaviour. For roadways we al-
ready have a wide spectrum of penalties 
for different types of misbehaviour, from, 
for example, small fines for parking in a 
clearway to jail time for causing death by 
the reckless use of a motor vehicle. There 
is no reason that the offence of “Causing 
Congestion” could not join the long list of 
all of our other traffic offences, with appro-
priate penalties attached. Tickets for caus-
ing congestion could be issued using the 
same general approach as parking tick-
ets; any private vehicle on a given stretch 
of road, on a given side of the road, at a 
given time, incurs a penalty. In contrast 
to parking tickets, though, such penal-
ties would be incurred by moving vehicles, 
rather than by parked vehicles. The moral 
basis for issuing such penalties is straight-
forward. Taking a car onto a congested 
roadway worsens the speed performance 
of that roadway for all. It is contributing to 
the despoiling of a public good. It is gener-
ally accepted that it is immoral to despoil 
a public good by taking more than your 
fair share of it. Immoral does not become 
moral just because everyone is doing it.
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Congestion offsets treat people as citizens, 
not customers. Citizens are expected to 
behave properly and to, amongst other 
things, not wantonly despoil public goods. 
For those who do not behave properly, 
socially agreed sanctions are imposed. A 
penalty approach is no different in prin-
ciple to controlling speeding; we do not 
have a market for speeding, we just pe-
nalise it sufficiently to reduce it to a social-
ly acceptable level. It is currently the case 
that driving a car onto a congested road is 
a widely accepted practice; a person who 
would be horrified to see someone drop 
litter in a public place, does not think twice 
about driving onto a road that they know 
to be congested. Attitudes have changed 
in the past though; drink driving used to 
be widely socially tolerated, smoking in 
public buildings used to be legal in many 
places where it is now banned. Attitudes 
can and do change.
Penalising people for “Causing Congestion” 
has a major organisational advantage over 
charging a fee for a service, namely that 
people do not usually complain when so-
ciety fails to punish them for their mis-
behaviour. Unlike prices, fines are fairly 
randomly imposed, with ‘speed traps’ and 
‘booze buses’ catching people sometimes, 
and not at other times. With fines, there is 
no need for the precise metering of road 
pricing. As with parking fines, a city gov-
ernment could just erect signs, citywide, 
saying that in these places, at these times, 
congestion is a problem and so such-and-
such a penalty will be imposed. These 
penalties could be enforced sufficiently 
to achieve the desired outcome, and no 
more. A person might drive all month in 
a congestion-prone area and only be fined 
once during that month, but if that fine 
is a significant percentage of the aver-
age monthly wage, behaviour will soon 
change. Congestion offsets do not require 
precise metering of roadway use, a key or-
ganisational weakness of road pricing.
To bring the above two points together; 
congestion offsets punish people who 
cause congestion and, in equal measure, 
reward people who alleviate congestion. 
Unlike road pricing, money is collected via 
fines for misbehaviour rather than a fee to 
purchase a service. Also unlike road pric-
ing, the money collected via fines is explic-
itly paid to those helping to reduce conges-
tion, in the form of cheaper bus services. 
Figure 8 shows mock-ups of how these 
fines and payments might look. The traffic 
infringement shown in Figure 8 would, on 
average, be issued once for every 50 of 
the bus tickets issued, thus both penalis-
ing and rewarding by the same amount, 
namely $100.
The approach shown in Figure 8 is one of 
offsets, thus the congestion offsets name. 
Due to widespread public discussion of 
climate change, the best known form of 
offsets are carbon offsets. Organisations 
who emit carbon dioxide as a result of 
their operations, who are said to have a 
certain ‘carbon footprint’, may choose to 
eliminate that footprint by buying carbon 
offsets, thus becoming ‘carbon neutral’. 
The money paid for carbon offsets is used 
to plant trees, or to fund other activities 
that remove carbon dioxide from the at-
Figure 8: Road Overuse Fines and Under-use Payments
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mosphere, with the outcome being no net 
carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere. 
Congestion offsets are the same concept, 
except rather than planting trees to re-
move carbon, people use buses to remove 
congestion. Importantly, unlike the case 
of carbon offsets, where no single govern-
ment controls the atmosphere, cities nor-
mally operate as a single political area and 
so congestion offsets could be mandated 
for all by a single government.
The defining characteristic of an offset is 
that it enables something negative to be 
wholly undone. With carbon, if enough off-
sets are purchased, an organisation’s car-
bon emissions can be wholly undone, and 
they can become carbon neutral. Many 
types of bad behaviour cannot be undone. 
For example, when a person parks in a 
clear-way, causing two lanes of a road to 
drop to being only one lane, great incon-
venience is caused. The fine received for 
this type of bad behaviour does not undo 
the damage; it is purely a punishment, a 
deterrent. By contrast, congestion offsets 
are a way of ensuring, in effect, that peo-
ple only take their fair share of road space, 
by responding to any attempt to take more 
than a fair share in a way that brings road 
use back under an agreed traffic level. 
Under a system of congestion offsets, if 
people wish to take what would be more 
than their fair share of road space they are 
required to sufficiently fund bus services 
such that the unfair portion of road space 
they are taking becomes available. Con-
gestion offsets would require all road us-
ers to be congestion neutral.
With the damage caused by congestion 
being wholly unwound, congestion offsets 
could be optionally charged as, in effect, 
a fee, instead of a fine. Take the example 
previously shown in Figure 8 where a con-
gestion fine of $100 is levied, but where the 
fine is incurred, on average, only once out 
of every fifty times that a given road sec-
tion is driven on. In this example a $2 con-
gestion fine could alternatively be charged 
each time, with GPS and mobile communi-
cation technology now making this easily 
achievable. Indeed, many commercial ve-
hicles are already fitted with live location 
tracking equipment. Congestion offsets 
could be charged as, in effect, a fee, for 
those who value determinacy more than 
privacy, or as a fine, for those who value 
privacy more than determinacy. It would 
be likely that most commercial vehicle op-
erators, including freight operators, would 
opt for the determinacy of a fee. Under 
congestion offsets, charging the fine as a 
fee would be an auxiliary measure, avail-
able on a vehicle-by-vehicle basis, with 
fines as the default mechanism.
It should be noted that a determinis-
tic outcome could be achieved without a 
high-tech, live-location metering solution. 
We have a well-established technology to 
deal with outlier risks, namely insurance. 
It comes with an administrative overhead, 
and the unpleasant but necessary need for 
fraud prevention measures, but it works. 
In a similar vein, sophisticated technol-
ogy such as that used in red-light cameras 
would no doubt be very useful in issuing 
congestion fines, but the task could also 
be done by a police officer with an in-
fringement pad. Likewise, super-computer 
modelling to determine optimal congestion 
offset levels would no doubt be beneficial, 
but crude try-and-adjust methods would 
achieve an acceptable outcome. Today’s 
high-technology — live location tracking, 
automatic fine cameras, super-computer 
modelling — would be very useful in re-
ducing cost and increasing efficiency, but 
such technologies are not necessary to 
deploy congestion offsets. We could have 
deployed congestion offsets at any time 
since the invention of the automobile; pa-
per fines, insurance and crude try-and-ad-
just modelling methods are all technolo-
gies that pre-date the automobile.
Living for so long without congestion con-
trol has led to the most perverse results, 
something that can be best demonstrated 
by considering the alternative. Imagine if 
it had been normal practice for towns to 
introduce a system of congestion offsets 
a generation or so before they had any 
chronic congestion problems. Car drivers 
in such towns would, from time-to-time, 
receive road space use notices, stating 
that on a given date and time they were 
recorded using one road slot when, say, 
two road slots were available; giving a 
roadway overuse level of zero slots. This 
notice would record that the fine for over-
using zero slots is zero dollars, and thank 
the driver for staying within the available 
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road space. Similarly, on the small bus 
services run by such towns, bus tickets 
would record that passengers had under-
used zero of the contested slots, due to a 
surplus of one slot per vehicle, and that 
they were receiving a discount of zero dol-
lars on their tickets.
During the twenty or thirty years before 
these towns had sufficient traffic to cause 
chronic congestion, no fines or discounts 
would be issued, but both car and bus us-
ers would see, as their towns grew, the 
excess road slots slowly being used up. 
For car drivers this would draw them clos-
er and closer to the day where they were 
going to start being fined for their road-
way overuse. By contrast, the diminishing 
number of free roadway slots would draw 
bus passengers closer and closer to the 
day where they were going to start being 
paid for their roadway under-use. One day, 
which people would have seen coming for 
decades, car drivers would start receiving 
occasional small fines for their roadway 
overuse, and bus passengers would start 
receiving tickets which stated that they 
had underused a tiny percentage of the 
contested road slots, and that they were 
therefore receiving a discount of one cent 
on their tickets. Over time, both the size 
of the fines being issued to drivers and the 
size of the bus ticket discount would in-
crease. Buses would slide into greater use 
as people found their share of the roadway 
commons dropping in line with urbanisa-
tion. There would be a slow increase in 
public transport use, simply as a matter 
of rational decision-making. Chronic con-
gestion would never be a feature of such 
towns’ transport planning landscape, as 
they grew from towns to cities.
Would a city with such a history ever talk 
about building large arterial roads simply 
to carry car traffic, or heavy rail lines in 
places where the passenger load simply 
did not justify the construction of such 
lines? It seems most unlikely. Far more 
likely, would be that both heavy road and 
heavy rail infrastructure would be built 
sparingly, and only when circumstances 
fully justified such construction. Not so 
in our cities today; once two lanes, one 
in each direction, are no longer sufficient 
to soak up traffic, four lane roads, or 
even heavier grade roads are built. Why, 
though, should private vehicles get to use 
up all this space when there are other us-
ers of street space? Why not have more 
bike lanes or wider footpaths? The same 
point could be made for space use within 
a single road lane. Throughout this paper, 
all calculations have been made on the as-
sumption that all of the capacity of a road 
lane was to be used by vehicles. If a road 
lane could take 700 cars, it did take 700 
cars, and without congestion control this is 
indeed what happens. A street with more 
traffic, though, is a worse street for eve-
ryone using it except the vehicle users.32 
Under a system of congestion offsets it 
would be possible to consciously run road 
lanes significantly below their maximum 
capacity. In the absence of congestion 
control, many of our cities have become 
awash with both traffic and bitumen.
One option for congestion offsets would be 
to implement them in a minimal way; to 
eliminate chronic congestion, but to still 
provide as much mobility as possible using 
cars. This would be an improvement over 
the current situation. Alternatively, con-
gestion offsets could be used in a trans-
formative way; to slowly squeeze a great 
deal of both the traffic and the bitumen 
out of our cities. Such an approach would 
see chronic congestion become a thing of 
the past, indeed many roads may be run 
well below capacity, so as to balance the 
needs of vehicle users and other street us-
ers. Many road widening projects would 
most likely be deemed no longer neces-
sary, and all existing road grades above 
two lanes, one in either direction, could be 
reviewed to see if the extra lanes were re-
ally necessary, or whether the land could 
be put to better uses. Mass mobility could 
be provided by a grid of high frequency, 
BRT-style bus services running on normal 
congestion-free roads. Under such a sys-
tem most people would travel on buses 
most of the time, with cars playing an im-
portant, but far smaller role than they do 
now. In short, congestion offsets could be 
used to help rehabilitate our cities from 
their current degraded state, where they 
are heavy with both traffic and bitumen. 
Congestion offsets could be an important 
new tool to help transform our cities.
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With congestion offsets now described, 
the question raised in the introduction as 
to whether congestion offsets constitute 
a distinct congestion control method can 
be revisited: are congestion offsets just 
a variant of road pricing? From a concep-
tual standpoint, road pricing and conges-
tion offsets are clearly different congestion 
control methods. The central concept be-
hind congestion offsets is to keep road-
ways as a commons, but to regulate that 
commons better, whereas the central con-
cept behind road pricing is to enclose the 
roadway commons, with the road space 
then being ‘parcelled up’ for sale. Even 
with congestion offsets being a conceptu-
ally distinct congestion control method it 
is nevertheless possible for two conceptu-
ally distinct methods to yield very similar 
policy prescriptions. If there are no signifi-
cant differences between the policy pre-
scriptions of congestion offsets and those 
of road pricing, then it would be difficult to 
maintain a position that congestion offsets 
are a distinct form of congestion control.
In cases where road pricing does not come 
packaged along with policy measures to 
funnel raised funds towards public trans-
port, congestion offsets are clearly a dis-
tinct form of congestion control; conges-
tion offsets take funds from road users 
and also give funds to road users, where-
as road pricing only takes funds from road 
users. This is a very significant difference 
in terms of policy prescriptions between 
congestion offsets and road pricing. But 
what about circumstances where road 
pricing does come packaged along with 
policy measures to funnel raised funds to-
wards public transport, such as in London. 
Are congestion offsets a clearly different 
form of congestion control in comparison 
to “road pricing plus public transport fund-
ing?” Putting aside the fact that we are no 
longer talking about road pricing, as such, 
but road pricing with an auxiliary policy 
bolted on the side, there are still key dif-
ferences in how road pricing and conges-
tion offsets take funds from road users 
and give funds to road users. Although the 
money raised from road pricing in London 
is ploughed back into improving their pub-
lic transport system, one is not reminded 
every time one gets on a bus, via an ex-
plicit financial reward, that one was under-
using his or her fair share of road space. 
Also, on the penalty side of the penalty/
reward equation, road users in London are 
not fined for their misbehaviour of overus-
ing the roads; they are instead offered the 
chance to purchase access to road space. 
The whole behavioural mechanism, the 
reward/penalty system and therefore psy-
chology of what this paper has proposed 
is very different from road pricing, even in 
cases where road pricing has been coupled 
with the funding of public transport.
Finally, there is the impact that using fines, 
instead of fees, has on ease of deployment. 
This fines-versus-fees difference between 
congestion offsets and road pricing stems 
directly from the fact that, unlike road 
pricing, congestion offsets have a built-in 
notion of what constitutes a fair share of 
road space, and can therefore advance the 
proposition that people who wantonly de-
spoil a public good by taking more than 
their fair share of it should be punished, 
via a fine. Fines can be randomly imposed, 
fees cannot. The fact that fees cannot 
be randomly imposed saddles road pric-
ing with the requirement for precise me-
tering, which has drastically restricted its 
deployment, usually to small central city 
areas, even when congestion is a citywide 
problem. This different policy prescription, 
the use of fines instead of fees, yields a 
concrete and highly beneficial outcome; 
it allows congestion control to be easily 
deployed citywide. Congestion offsets are 
not a variant of road pricing; they are a 
distinct method of congestion control.
For readers who remain unconvinced, who 
continue to view congestion offsets as 
simply an aggressive repackaging of road 
pricing into a more ‘palatable’ form, these 
readers are invited to consider the pos-
sibility that an aggressive repackaging of 
road pricing into a more ‘palatable’ form 
is, in fact, desperately needed. In terms 
of the number and scope of deployments, 
road pricing has been a spectacularly un-
successful policy. The idea of road pric-
ing has been around for decades, during 
which time congestion has grown to be 
an enormous worldwide problem, and yet 
only a handful of cities have adopted road 
pricing schemes. In a continuation of this 
trend, a road pricing scheme for New York 
has been recently shelved by the New York 
State Assembly.33  The normal response, 
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when a ‘product’ fails to ‘sell’ well over an 
extended period of time, is to redesign the 
product into something that people actual-
ly want to buy. Instead, those advocating 
road pricing appear to be doggedly trying 
to sell something that, the evidence sug-
gests, not many people want to buy. The 
difficulties inherent in this course of action 
are highlighted by one of the questions to 
be discussed at an urban congestion con-
ference scheduled to be held some months 
after the finalisation of this paper. One 
panel at this conference, somewhat sur-
prisingly, plan to, amongst other things, 
engage themselves with “delving deeper 
into the road pricing scheme and answer-
ing the ultimate question of whether it 
is a death wish or real solution?”t4  That 
congestion control through traditional 
road pricing approaches could possibly be 
equated with a “death wish”, gives con-
siderable pause to thought and highlights 
the difficulties faced in trying to introduce 
road pricing in its present form on a large 
scale in cities. The authors suggest that 
this course of action should be reconsid-
ered in light of the demonstrated history 
of its results, and the lack of any solid evi-
dence suggesting that there might be a 
significant improvement of those results in 
the future.
Whether the approach presented in this 
paper is called congestion offsets, or road 
pricing with fairness built in, or social road 
pricing, or road pricing 2.0, is not a mat-
ter of great consequence. As the previous 
section of this paper detailed, the urban 
transport situation is far worse than gen-
erally acknowledged. Buses on normal 
roads, an entire transportation mode, and 
one that cannot be effectively substituted 
for, has been crippled by congestion, with 
disastrous results. This terrible situation is 
a matter of great consequence, and one 
that will only be resolved by the wide-
spread deployment of an effective form of 
congestion control. Consequently, there is 
a desperate need for a congestion control 
method that works, that is easy to deploy 
and that has the concept of fairness built 
into its fundamental design principles, so 
that it has some hope of being acceptable 
to the general public. Road pricing meets 
one of those three requirements, namely 
that it works; congestion offsets meet all 
three.
The urban transport problems of cities, 
no matter how dire, are, of course, only 
one part of the bigger urban sustainability 
picture. However effective congestion off-
sets might be in addressing the particular 
sustainability problems of urban transport, 
they would, on the whole, be an ineffective 
tool for addressing the broader sustaina-
bility problems of cities. Tools are normally 
only any good at solving the problem they 
were designed to solve, and congestion 
offsets are a tool that has been designed 
to solve transportation problems, not 
wider social, economic or environmental 
problems. Introduce a system of conges-
tion offsets in a socially unjust, economi-
cally stagnant and environmentally ruined 
city that also happened to have terrible 
traffic problems, and the likely outcome 
would be a socially unjust, economically 
stagnant and environmentally ruined city 
that no longer had terrible traffic prob-
lems. Ways of addressing these wider so-
cial, economic and environmental issues 
have been extensively described by oth-
ers, and the broader sustainability of cit-
ies, their capacity to become regenerative 
in a wider sense, rests on a broad array of 
issues and strategies for action.35 
Conclusion
A major part of the urban transport prob-
lem today is a failure from the very be-
ginning to acknowledge that congestion is 
fundamentally inequitable and unfair, im-
practical to construct away, and therefore 
must be properly charged for and control-
led to eliminate the transport system dys-
function which is systemic in cities today. 
By permitting free access to roadways 
as a matter of policy, governments have 
allowed cars to cripple the natural com-
petitor for mid-level loads, namely bus 
services on normal roads. Cars dominate 
urban transport in most of the world not 
due to any inherent performance superior-
ity, but because they have what amounts 
to a government-granted monopoly. In the 
absence of an effective mid-level transport 
mode, the next best option for transport 
planners has been to try and make low 
and high load modes look like good mid-
level modes. To this end, the load capac-
ity of roads has been greatly increased via 
road building projects and the load capac-
ity of railways has been greatly reduced by 
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operating them well under capacity. Run-
ning railways well under capacity at least 
has the advantage of only costing cities 
money. Greatly increasing the load capac-
ity of roads via road building projects has 
blighted our cities, leaving many of them 
bloated with both traffic and bitumen.
As a solution to the urban transport prob-
lem, road pricing has been near univer-
sally rejected, and for good reason. Road 
pricing requires precise metering, making 
it difficult to deploy, and disenfranchises 
the public from the roadway commons, 
making it all but impossible to sell politi-
cally. Road pricing is, in short, a complex 
and unfair form of congestion control.
Congestion offsets have been presented 
here as an alternative to road pricing. In 
brief, congestion offsets involve penalis-
ing private vehicle users for overusing 
the roads and rewarding public bus users 
for under-using them. The design princi-
ple behind this approach is that roadway 
congestion should be addressed not by 
constructing a market, but by regulating 
a commons. Under congestion offsets, a 
person who, on average, uses only their 
fair share of roadway space would not in-
cur any direct net costs. Even in the case of 
overuse, there is no transfer of value out-
side of the users of the roads, with value 
simply being transferred from over-users 
to under-users. Unlike road pricing, con-
gestion offsets do not disenfranchise the 
public of the roadway commons. Also fol-
lowing from the design principle that con-
gestion should be addressed by regulating 
a commons, congestion offsets ‘lean’ on 
roadway over-users not by charging them 
for roadway space, as such, but by punish-
ing them for their misbehaviour via fines. 
Consequently, unlike road pricing, conges-
tion offsets do not require precise meter-
ing. Congestion offsets are, in short, a 
simple and fair form of congestion control.
Better cities are possible. A tolerable ac-
commodation with congestion is not the 
only option. Congestion offsets, a simple 
and fair alternative to road pricing, would 
allow congestion to be squeezed out of our 
cities, and for bus services to emerge as 
an efficient and effective mode for servic-
ing mid-level transport loads. The massive 
distortions we have allowed to build up in 
our cities, in the absence of such a mode, 
could be slowly unwound. Lean roads on 
multi-purpose streets could become the 
norm, as they should have always been. 
Simply by deciding to let buses compete, 
we could help to transform our cities in 
significant ways by addressing two key is-
sues: the modal split between private mo-
torised and public motorised modes and 
the endemic congestion that plagues cit-
ies. Like the great freeway project this is a 
big dream, but our cities are our collective 
homes and we should dream big dreams 
about them. Congestion offsets could be a 
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